Most reasons for validation do not apply; the IP will come from a Request property built from information in the underlying connection that will already have been validated to a large extent and hence while it could be spoofed, it couldn't be faked to be something that isn't actually an IP address.
However, two reasons remain. One is that the mistrust in security is not just of intent but also of success; we can trust the layer giving us the IP address to not deliberately give us something else, but we can't necessarily trust it to be successful in its own checks - maybe some day an exploit is found that tricks that layer into passing something else. The other is that depending on what you are going to do with this IP, maybe a spoofed IP could cause some damage (this requires validation beyond merely validating the IP is an IP).
A counter-argument is that if all you are doing is logging, then as long as you use normal approaches to ensuring the formatting of data, logging the malicious code won't do anything nasty in itself.
A counter-counter-argument is that if the only thing you are doing is logging today, this may not be the case later in the project's lifetime.
On balance therefore, validation is reasonable to do, though I wouldn't freak out if I saw someone not doing so.
Do take care to make sure your validation accepts IPv6 addresses; they are still rare enough that your testing might not use any, but common enough (and getting more common) that you will hit them in production code. You don't want to block legitimate users because you encounter an IPv6 address.