I'm not sure this provides any sort of security. If a man-in-the-middle attacker wants to change the parameters, all he must do is change the query string and recompute the SHA-1 hash and send that request along to the server.
For example, the URL sent by the browser might be:
http://www.example.com/addUser.html?parameterA=foo&hash=SHA1("parameterA=foo")
If an attacker intercepts this, he can edit it in this way:
http://www.example.com/adduser.html?parameterA=bar&hash=SHA1("parameterA=bar")
Really, this boils down to the fact you can trust the hash only as much as the parameters themselves.
One way you could fix this would be if the user has a password that only he and the server knows, then it would be impossible for the attacker to recompute the hash if he changes the parameters. For example:
http://www.example.com/addUser.html?parameterA=foo&hash=SHA1("parameterA=foo"+"theuserpassword")
But don't put the password as one of the parameters in the URL :)
It is important to note that this isn't the state of the art for verifying the integrity of messages passed between two parties. What is used today is a form of the Hash-based Message Authenticion Code (HMAC) algorithm, which is pretty well described in HMAC, and definitively in RFC2104 and FIPS Pub 198-1.