If it's an old implementation of crypt(3)
, using DES, then you can almost (but not quite) brute-force it.
In that scheme, the input is truncated to 8 characters, and each character to 7 bits, which means there's a 56 bit space of distinct passwords to search.
For DES alone, you can search the whole space in about 18 days on $10K worth of FPGAs (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard#Brute_force_attack), so the expected time is 9 days. But I'm assuming you don't have $10K to spend on the problem. Give it a few more years, and who knows whether DES crackers will run in plausible time on a PC's GPU.
Even then, crypt(3)
traditionally involves 25 rounds of DES, with slight modifications to the algorithm based on the salt, so you'd expect it to be at least 25 times slower to brute-force.
Newer implementations of crypt(3)
are way beyond brute force, since they're based on better hash algorithms than the DES-based one that old crypt(3)
used.
Of course if the string isn't random (e.g. if it's a password chosen by some human), then you may be able to get a much better expected time than brute force.