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3513

answers:

11

I've been preaching both to my colleagues and here on SO about the goodness of using parameters in SQL queries, especially in .NET applications. I've even gone so far as to promise them as giving immunity against SQL injection attacks.

But I'm starting to wonder if this really is true. Are there any known SQL injection attacks that will be successfull against a parameterized query? Can you for example send a string that causes a buffer overflow on the server?

There are of course other considerations to make to ensure that a web application is safe (like sanitizing user input and all that stuff) but now I am thinking of SQL injections. I'm especially interested in attacks against MsSQL 2005 and 2008 since they are my primary databases, but all databases are interesting.

Edit: To clarify what I mean by parameters and parameterized queries. By using parameters I mean using "variables" instead of building the sql query in a string.
So instead of doing this:

SELECT * FROM Table WHERE Name = 'a name'

We do this:

SELECT * FROM Table WHERE Name = @Name

and then set the value of the @Name parameter on the query / command object.

+29  A: 

Placeholders are enough to prevent injections. You might still be open to buffer overflows, but that is a completely different flavor of attack from an SQL injection (the attack vector would not be SQL syntax but binary). Since the parameters passed will all be escaped properly, there isn't any way for an attacker to pass data that will be treated like "live" SQL.

You can't use functions inside placeholders, and you can't use placeholders as column or table names, because they are escaped and quoted as string literals.

However, if you use parameters as part of a string concatenation inside your dynamic query, you are still vulnerable to injection, because your strings will not be escaped but will be literal. Using other types for parameters (such as integer) is safe.

That said, if you're using use input to set the value of something like security_level, then someone could just make themselves administrators in your system and have a free-for-all. But that's just basic input validation, and has nothing to do with SQL injection.

Adam Bellaire
The key point is understanding the issue raised by Steve Lowe's answer, also pointed out in the article @mikekidder cites -- you have to be wary wherever the Dynamic SQL is, whether in the application or in the server. Dynamic SQL is dangerous - but can be made safe.
Jonathan Leffler
"there isn't any way for an attacker to pass data that will be treated like 'live' SQL". - This isn't quite true, see examples below.
Booji Boy
All the examples below are defining "parameterised query" to mean SQL code accepting parameters. The normal definition is a query that uses your DBMS parameters collection. Barring a DBMS bug, this latter technique prevents SQL injection.
RoadWarrior
Wrong - read some links posted.
Booji Boy
I have read every single link. Please cite any link that refers to a working injection attack against the DBMS Parameters collection. Indeed, the link that you posted specifically refers to this approach as defeating SQL injection (see the "Using Type-Safe SQL Parameters" section).
RoadWarrior
What are Placeholders?
kirk.burleson
+10  A: 

any sql parameter of string type (varchar, nvarchar, etc) that is used to construct a dynamic query is still vulnerable

otherwise the parameter type conversion (e.g. to int, decimal, date, etc.) should eliminate any attempt to inject sql via the parameter

EDIT: an example, where parameter @p1 is intended to be a table name

create procedure dbo.uspBeAfraidBeVeryAfraid ( @p1 varchar(64) ) 
AS
    SET NOCOUNT ON
    declare @sql varchar(512)
    set @sql = 'select * from ' + @p1
    exec(@sql)
GO

If @p1 is selected from a drop-down list it is a potential sql-injection attack vector;

If @p1 is formulated programmatically w/out the ability of the user to intervene then it is not a potential sql-injection attack vector

Steven A. Lowe
No; the whole point is that the string passed to the DBMS is not part of the SQL statement. Therefore, the value in the string makes no difference to the interpretation of the SQL - just to the values referenced by the SQL.
Jonathan Leffler
That is how I see parameters as well. They are supposed to prevent this problem.
Rune Grimstad
@[Jonathan Leffler]: @Rune: see edits
Steven A. Lowe
Steven is right if for example you are passing a string into a sp that uses it to run something like sp_executeSql (sql server) then you still have a sql injection risk.
alexmac
Ha! Good point! I didn't think of that.
Rune Grimstad
@Steven: that is not a parameter to the SQL; you would have to have a placeholder (question mark) in place of the string concatenation. And SQL does not allow you to specify the table name by placeholder. That is a pure SQL injection vulnerability - the original problem.
Jonathan Leffler
@Steven: maybe the term 'parameter' has been overloaded once too often. :D
Jonathan Leffler
Despite what I said previously, this example is interesting. At the surface level, something is going to execute the stored procedure and pass the user input as a parameter to it, preferably via a placeholder. But that isn't the 'real SQL'. The advice is correct - but needs to be understood.
Jonathan Leffler
Continuing: it is crucial that people understand SQL injection fully (see http://xkcd.org/327) and understand how the vulnerability arises, and ensure that the DML statements are under control. You shouldn't do DDL at all, usually, not least because the statements don't take parameters.
Jonathan Leffler
So I definitely see why this is vulnerable, it's really no better than building your statement in code, can anybody think of WHY you would do this? It pretty much defeats the entire purpose of stored procs. The engine can't precompile and reuse intermediate code and there is little or no type checking...so it seems to me that there is zero benefit to this other than perhaps some level of decoupling that allows you to just call the proc from code rather than having it in the actual code
Chris Thompson
@[Chris Thompson]: the above example is contrived and overly-simplistic; no sane programmer would ever do that...so of course, someone somewhere will do exactly that ;-). Seriously, more complex circumstances can arise where dynamic construction of sql is the "best" solution, you just have to be very very careful to sanitize any parts of the dynamic sql that can originate from user input.
Steven A. Lowe
+5  A: 

A buffer overflow is not SQL injection.

Parametrized queries guarantee you are safe against SQL injection. They don't guarantee there aren't possible exploits in the form of bugs in your SQL server, but nothing will guarantee that.

Blorgbeard
+1  A: 

It is possible for a stored proc to be vulnerable to special types of SQL injection via overflow/truncation, see: Injection Enabled by Data Truncation here:

http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms161953.aspx

Booji Boy
If you read the article in detail, you'll see that using SQL Server's Parameters collection prevents this attack. And that's the normal definition of a "parameterised Query" - it uses the Parameters collection of the DBMS.
RoadWarrior
+8  A: 

Rune -

Here is a dated article, but still valid:

SQL Injection - Are parameterized queries safe?

mikekidder
That's a good article. That was a great DNR! I was trying to find that one but you beat me to it!
Booji Boy
Interesting but scary stuff!
Rune Grimstad
Well sure, if you're building SQL through string concatenation, then all bets are off. But in using parameters, you're supposed to be avoiding having to do any string concatenation. But yeah, using parameters doesn't keep you from doing other stupid stuff.
Kyralessa
That article mounts an attack against a stored proc with parameters. This is quite different from a parameterized query, where the stated will NOT work.
RoadWarrior
So it means parameters in SP doesn't save you from SQL injection. Wow! I was thinking we should be safe in this way.
Ken Yao
@ Ken yao: if you read the article, you see it can be fixed by using parameters in the dynamic sql execute call.
Thomas Stock
+2  A: 

Your data is not safe if you use dynamic sql in any way shape or form because the permissions must be at the table level. Yes you have limited the type and amount of injection attack from that particular query, but not limited the access a user can get if he or she finds a way into the system and you are completely vunerable to internal users accessing what they shouldn't in order to commit fraud or steal personal information to sell. Dynamic SQL of any type is a dangerous practice. If you use non-dynamic stored procs, you can set permissions at the procesdure level and no user can do anything except what is defined by the procs (except system admins of course).

HLGEM
so the lesson here is that if you must use dynamic sql, only do so inside of a stored procedure. +1 good advice!
Steven A. Lowe
No -- dynamic SQL in stored procs can still introduce SQL injection flaws, by interpolating unvalidated data into the dynamic query.
Bill Karwin
No the lesson here is to never use dynamic SQl
HLGEM
@HLGEM - right, and automobiles are involved in traffic accidents, so we should never use automobiles.
Bill Karwin
But dynamic SQL in a stored proc runs (by default) with the permission of the caller, not like static SQL which runs with the permission of the stored proc owner. This is an important distinction.
RoadWarrior
+5  A: 

No, there is still risk of SQL injection any time you interpolate unvalidated data into an SQL query.

Query parameters help to avoid this risk by separating literal values from the SQL syntax.

'SELECT * FROM mytable WHERE colname = ?'

That's fine, but there are other purposes of interpolating data into a dynamic SQL query that cannot use query parameters, because it's not an SQL value but instead a table name, column name, expression, or some other syntax.

'SELECT * FROM ' + @tablename + ' WHERE colname IN (' + @comma_list + ')'
' ORDER BY ' + @colname'

It doesn't matter whether you're using stored procedures or executing dynamic SQL queries directly from application code. The risk is still there.

The remedy in these cases is to employ FIEO as needed:

  • Filter Input: validate that the data look like legitimate integers, table names, column names, etc. before you interpolate them.

  • Escape Output: in this case "output" means putting data into a SQL query. We use functions to transform variables used as string literals in an SQL expression, so that quote marks and other special characters inside the string are escaped. We should also use functions to transform variables that would be used as table names, column names, etc. As for other syntax, like writing whole SQL expressions dynamically, that's a more complex problem.

Bill Karwin
+9  A: 

There seems to be some confusion in this thread about the definition of a "parameterised query".

  • SQL such as a stored proc that accepts parameters.
  • SQL that is called using the DBMS Parameters collection.

Given the former definition, many of the links show working attacks.

But the "normal" definition is the latter one. Given that definition, I don't know of any SQL injection attack that will work. That doesn't mean that there isn't one, but I have yet to see it.

From the comments, I'm not expressing myself clearly enough, so here's an example that will hopefully be clearer:

This approach is open to SQL injection

exec dbo.MyStoredProc 'DodgyText'

This approach isn't open to SQL injection

using (SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand("dbo.MyStoredProc", testConnection))
{
    cmd.CommandType = CommandType.StoredProcedure;
    SqlParameter newParam = new SqlParameter(paramName, SqlDbType.Varchar);
    newParam.Value = "DodgyText";
    .....
    cmd.Parameters.Add(newParam);
    .....
    cmd.ExecuteNonQuery();
}
RoadWarrior
Can you clarify what you mean by the DBMS Parameters collection as opposed to a procedure that accepts parameters?
Rune Grimstad
Rune, read the "Use Type-Safe SQL Parameters" section of this link:http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms161953.aspx
RoadWarrior
My response was to Rune's original question, before it was edited with the update.
mikekidder
I knew this weird wiki aspect wouldn't work quite right :-)
RoadWarrior
I've read and reread that msdn-article on sql injection and I still don't see how there is a difference between the parameters a stored procedure takes and the parameters a dynamic query takes. Apart from the fact that dynamic queries are dynamic. You still have to bind the parameters, right?
Rune Grimstad
It's the binding that makes the difference. If you call a stored proc with parameters directly, no input filtering is done. But if you bind by (for example) by using the SqlCommand parameters collection in .NET, all of the parameters will be filtered and treated as plain text.
RoadWarrior
Thanks for the example! It was just what I was wondering about. :-)
Rune Grimstad
+1  A: 

Just remember that with parameters you can easily store the string, or say username if you don't have any policies, "); drop table users; --"

This in itself won't cause any harm, but you better know where and how that date is used further on in your application (e.g. stored in a cookie, retrieved later on to do other stuff.

nos
+1  A: 

I just had my first experience with a SQL Injection attack. It is a pain in the but to clean up so there is no such thing as too much security if it doesn't interfere with functionality. I believe the attach came through a stored procedure and was wondering if anyone had a out side of the box solution to sanitize data coming into a stored procedure paramater?

JoshOiknine
Ouch! Being attacked can be a painful experience... If you cannot use parameters for some reason then you may use the approach I suggest in this question: http://stackoverflow.com/questions/910465/avoiding-sql-injection-without-parameters But you really shouldn't do it. Always ALWAYS use parameters :-)
Rune Grimstad