I seem to have fallen into the misunderstanding that the others have - the question was about external authorization. Personally, I would only trust distributed authorization on a local network where I have control over the authentication and authorization servers. I would never use external authorization on a web site.
Below are my comments on OpenID as a authentication service.
1) As was pointed out, authorization != authentication. OpenID handles authentication, but the web app owner still has full control over the rights assigned to that login. This is a positive, but the confusion about this is a negative.
2) I can't find the link, but OpenID is open to social engineering / main in the middle / phishing attacks. The providers try to prevent this (ID images, browser certificates, call back verification, etc) but it doesn't help when the black hat site pops up a dialog / page that says "enter your OpenID user name and password" and the genius user complies.
3) Each provider of a federated ID has the ability (and some would say responsibility) to track all the activities of their users, regardless of what site they use the ID for. This is why Google and Yahoo are gung-ho to provide federated IDs, but not so excited about consuming them.
4) Contrary to an above comment, it is commonly the case that using OpenID reduces the barrier to registration, especially when a helpful UI points out that a new user probably already has an OpenID. This is even more true when you use a combined OpenID / OAuth solution such as RPX.
So, from my point of view, the risks of using OpenID are on the user, not the web site. I can't prevent the user from being phished by making them try to remember yet another user ID & password. Further, Black Hats don't need to do anything more nefarious than store user passwords for their site in plain text to get access to a user's other accounts. How many people use a different password for every web site the log into?