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274

answers:

3

I don't mind so much about pirating etcetera, but I want to ensure that the backend (Rails based) isn't open to automated services that could DOS it etc. Therefore I'd like to simply ensure that all access to the backend (which will be a few REST queries to GET and PUT data) will be via a valid iPhone application, and not some script running on a machine.

I want to avoid the use of accounts so that the user experience is seamless.

My first intention is to hash the UDID and a secret together, and provide that (and the UDID) over a HTTPS connection to the server. This will either allow an authenticated session to be created or return an error.

If eavesdropped, then an attacker could take the hash and replay it, leaving this scheme open to replay attacks. However shouldn't the HTTPS connection protect me against eavesdropping?

Thanks!

+1  A: 

There is no way to ensure it, since it can be spoofed.

If you really want to go this route (honestly, unless you're doing something really super mission critical here you are probably wasting your time), you could pass along the iPhone device token. Or maybe hash it and then pass it along. Of course, you have no way to validate it on the Server Side or anything, but if a bad guy really wants to take you down, here is roadblock #1 that he will have to deal with first.

bpapa
+1  A: 

Like bpapa says, it can be spoofed, but then, like you say, you aren't worried about that so much as anybody coming along and just sending a thousand requests to your server in a row, and your server having to process each one.

Your idea of the hash is a good start. From there, you could also append the current timestamp to the pre-hashed value, and send that along as well. If the given timestamp is more than 1 day different from the server's current time, disallow access. This stops replay attacks for more than a day later anyway.

Another option would be to use a nonce. Anybody can request a nonce from your server, but then the device has to append that to the pre-hash data before sending the hash to the server. Generated nonces would have to be stored, or, could simply be the server's current timestamp. The device then has to append the server's timestamp instead of its own timestamp to the pre-hashed data, allowing for a much shorter period than a full day for a replay attack to occur.

Ed Marty
I think this is probably the way I'll go. I hadn't considered hashing the timestamp (or at least the current date) too, and I like the way that it will prevent replay attacks. There might be some slight hiccups with a hash mismatch if someone submits a request half a second before midnight, and the server picks the next day to take the date value for the hash, but as long as I then check dates either side it should be good.I think this represents a good mix of options. I'll get an SSL certificate so I can't be eavesdropped, and use a hash with time and secret for the data.Thanks!
Nex
+1  A: 

Use SSL with client certificate. Have a private key in your client and issue a certificate for it, and your web server can require this client cert to be present in order for the sessions to proceed.

I can't give code details for Rails, but architecture-wise it's the most secure thing to do, even though might be a bit overkill. SSL with certificates is a standard industry solution and libraries exist for both the iPhone/client end and server end, so you don't have to invent anything or implement much, just get them to work nicely together.

You could also consider HMAC, like HMAC-SHA1, which is basically a standardization of the hashes stuff that other people here talk about. If you added nonces to it, you'd also be safe against replay attack. For an idea about how to implement HMAC-SHA1 with nonces, you could look at OAuth protocol (not the whole flow, but just how they tie nonce and other parameters together into an authenticated request).

Jaanus
That's a fantastic answer. I think there may be a touch too much complexity for me to have the private key on the client, but I appreciate that it's the most formal and secure method. I'll certainly look at what's required, thanks!
Nex