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107

answers:

4

Anytime a username/password authentication is used, the common wisdom is to protect the transport of that data using encryption (SSL, HTTPS, etc). But that leaves the end points potentially vulnerable.

Realistically, which is at greater risk of intrusion?

Transport layer: Compromised via wireless packet sniffing, malicious wiretapping, etc.

Transport devices: Risks include ISPs and Internet backbone operators sniffing data.

End-user device: Vulnerable to spyware, key loggers, shoulder surfing, and so forth.

Remote server: Many uncontrollable vulnerabilities including malicious operators, break-ins resulting in stolen data, physically heisting servers, backups kept in insecure places, and much more.

My gut reaction is that although the transport layer is relatively easy to protect via SSL, the risks in the other areas are much, much greater, especially at the end points. For example, at home my computer connects directly to my router; from there it goes straight to my ISPs routers and onto the Internet. I would estimate the risks at the transport level (both software and hardware) at low to non-existant. But what security does the server I'm connected to have? Have they been hacked into? Is the operator collecting usernames and passwords, knowing that most people use the same information at other websites? Likewise, has my computer been compromised by malware? Those seem like much greater risks.

My question is this: should I be worried if a service I'm using or developing doesn't use SSL? Sure, it's a low-hanging fruit, but there are a lot more fruit up above.

A: 

Let's not forgot things like:

  • leaving logged-in sessions unattended
  • writing passwords on stickies
SamB
A: 

The real risk is stupid users.

  • They leave their terminals open when they go to lunch.
  • Gullible in front of any service personell doing "service".
  • Storing passords and passphrases on notes next to the computer.
  • In great numbers someone someday will install the next Killer App (TM) which takes down the network.

Through users, any of the risks you mention can be accomplished trough social engineering.

Kent
+1 For mention of "service personnel".
mmsmatt
A: 

Just because you think the other parts of your communications might be unsafe doesn't mean you shouldn't protect the bits that you can protect as best you can.

The things you can do are:

  • Protect your own end
  • give your message a good shot at surviving the internet, by wrapping it up warm.
  • try to make sure that the other end is not an impostor.

The transport is where more people can listen-in than at any other stage. (There could only be a maximum 2 or 3 people standing behind you while you type in your password, but dozens could be plugged into the same router, doing a man-in-the-middle attack, hundreds could be sniffing your wifi-packets)

If you don't encrypt your message then anyone along the way can get a copy.

If you're communicating with a malicious/negligent end-point, then you're in trouble no matter what security you use, you have to avoid that scenario (authenticate them to you as well as you to them (server-certs))

None of these problems have been solved, or anywhere close. But going out there naked is hardly the solution.

Loopo
+1  A: 

By far the biggest target in network security is the Remote server. In the case of a Web Browser and an HTTP Server, the most common threats are in the form of XSS and XSRF. Remote Servers are juicy targets for other protocols as well because they often have an open port which is globally accessable.

XSS can be used to bypass the Same-Origin Policy. This can be used by a hacker to fire off xmlhttprequests to steal data from a remote server. XSS is wide spread and easy for hackers to find.

Cross-Site Request Forgeries (XSRF) can be used to change a the password for an account on a remote server. It can also be used to Hijack mail from your gmail account. Like XSS, this vulnerability type is also wide spread and easy to find.

The next biggest risk is the "Transport layer", but I'm not talking about TCP. Instead you should worry more about the other network layers. Such as OSI Layer 1, the Physical Layer such as 802.11b. Being able to sniff the wireless traffic at your local cafe can be incredibly fruitful if applications aren't properly using ssl. A good example is the Wall of Sheep. You should also worry about OSI Layer 2, the Data Link Layer, ARP spoofing can be used to sniff a switched wired network as if it where a wireless broadcast. OSI Layer 4 can be compromised with SSLStrip. Which can still be used to this day to undermine TLS/SSL used in HTTPS.

The next up is End-user device. Users are dirty, if you every come across one of these "Users" tell them to take a shower! No seriously, users are dirty because they have lots of: Spyware/Viruses/Bad Habits.

Last up is Transport devices. Don't get me wrong, this is an incredibly juicy target for any hacker. The problem is that serious vulnerabilities have been discovered in Cisco IOS and nothing has really happened. There hasn't been a major worm to affect any router. At the end of the day its unlikely that this part of your network will be directly compromised. Although, if a transport device is responsible for your security, as in the case of a hardware firewall, then mis-configurations can be devastating.

Rook