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128

answers:

2

This question is similar to this, but that one only references MD5 collision demos.

Are there any actual SHA1 collision pairs of arbitrary messages known so far ?

I'd like to use these to test how various software products (my own one and some third party) deal with it.

Doing some Google searches only turned up the oh-so prominent MD5 / SHA0 collisions and some hints on an approach to creating SHA1 collisions but I could not get my hands on any examples.

A: 

There is an example here

Ben Robinson
Thanks for the link, I'll check that.
Archimedix
It seems that the example provided is for a 58-round SHA-1 rather than the official 80 rounds.
Archimedix
+3  A: 

There is no known collision for SHA-1 yet. Right now:

  • There are some collisions on reduced versions of SHA-1, with less than the 80 rounds of the standard SHA-1.
  • An algorithm has been describe, which should obtain a SHA-1 collision with a computational effort roughly equivalent to 263 invocations of SHA-1 on small messages; that's much better than generic algorithms (which require 280 invocations on average) but that's still quite big and that algorithm has not been run yet.

There was an effort to obtain a SHA-1 collision by harnessing power from whoever had some spare CPU clock cycles to donate, with the BOINC framework to organize the whole thing, but there were not enough volunteers and the effort was abandoned last year. Hence no actual SHA-1 collision yet.

Theoretical attacks rely on some assumptions which may prove to be slightly false; for instance, the attack on MD5 is actually a bit faster than expected (at some point there is a property which must be fulfilled, with a theoretical probability of 2-28, but in practice it is more like 2-27.7, i.e. the attack is 20% faster than predicted). It is still considered that the theoretical attack is correct and the complexity "rather accurate".

Thomas Pornin
There's a recent two-block 73-round collision (http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/413.pdf). SHA-1 considered harmful!
tc.